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INTRODUCTION
In her September 2012 article, Partial Valuation in Cost-Benefit Analysis
(Partial Valuation),' and in a related May 2012 essay for RegBlog,2 Arden
Rowell argues that regulators should stop "refusing" 3 to place dollar figures
on some goods, like "emotional goods," 4 that are incommensurable with
money; if people are willing to pay anything for such goods, then before
agencies propose major new regulations, a dollar figure should be
generated to express these goods' monetary values for use in regulatory
cost-benefit analyses (CBAs).5 She argues that, in its analysis of a pending
regulation that would make rearview cameras standard auto safety
equipment, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
should have monetized the value of the unique trauma experienced by
parents who back over and kill their own children.6 This emotional harm
may be technically incommensurable with money, but if people are willing
to pay something to avoid it then it is not totally non-monetizable, and so,
she argues, it must be possible to express some portion of its total holistic
1. Arden Rowell, Partial Valuation in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 723 (2012).
2. Arden Rowell, Valuing the Rear-view Camera Rule, REGBLOG (May 30, 2012),
http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2012/05/30-rowell-camera.html.
3. Rowell, supra note 1, at 724; see also Rowell, supra note 2.
4. Rowell, supra note 1, at 724.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 737, 742; Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Low-Speed Vehicles
Phase-In Reporting Requirements, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,186 (proposed Dec. 7, 2010) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585). A 2008 law directed the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) to establish improved rearview standards to protect
bicyclists and pedestrians from being struck by reversing vehicles. See Cameron Gulbransen
Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-189, 122 Stat. 639-642 (2008)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (Supp. 2011)). As of October 6, 2012, a
proposed final rule that would require automakers to phase in rearview cameras for all
passenger vehicles is currently under review at the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), where it has been "under review" since November 16, 2011. See OFFICE OF INFO. &
REGULATORY AFFAIRS, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. Ill, Rearview Mirrors,
REGINFO, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201110&RIN=
2127-AK43 (last visited on Nov. 30, 2012); infra Part V. The agency has stated that it plans
to finalize a rule by the end of 2012. Peter Valdes-Dapena, Rearview Car Camera Rules Delayed
by US., CNNMONEY, Feb. 29, 2012, http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/29/autos/
rearview-cameras.postponed/index.htm.
1014 [64:4
BEAUTHAM AT THE OMB
value in dollar terms. 7 She argues that the regulation should be blocked by
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) until "the agency completes
an adequate analysis." 8
But NHTSA cannot pull a defensible monetary value for this highly
specific trauma out of thin air. The proposed expanded monetization
process would require agencies to acquire ad hoc valuation estimates for
any regulatory goods that are incommensurable with money, but for which
there exists some "willingness to pay," goods that often could not be even
partially monetized without significant new research. This "partial
valuation" process would attempt to disaggregate the incommensurable
good's holistic value by separating out the estimated monetizable portion of
the good from its non-monetized "remainder," 9 which risks being forgotten
in the analysis once a monetary value is assigned.
Partial valuation is already contained in the regulatory economist's
toolbox: few would contend that the dollar values commonly assigned to
human lives for the purpose of regulatory analyses represent complete
accountings of those lives' holistic values, yet human lives are already
regularly included in CBAs. At issue is the extent to which this incomplete
monetization of incommensurables should be understood to be mandatory.
Any expanded partial valuation requirement would inevitably delay
many vital lifesaving and environmental regulations and would
commandeer scarce agency resources that might be better used in other
ways by regulatory agencies. And it seems unlikely that policymakers will
make better choices if incommensurable benefits are always broken apart
into the proposed components instead of being described narratively and
holistically in at least some analyses.
Thus, it is critical to examine the reasons Professor Rowell offers for
arguing that agency CBAs should monetize all regulatory goods for which
any willingness to pay exists, including goods that are currently expressed in
nonmonetized, narrative form in agency regulatory analyses.
Professor Rowell contends in Partial Valuation that the executive orders
governing regulatory review might not permit any consideration of non-
monetized benefits when agencies are deciding whether the benefits of
proposed regulations justify their costs-a threshold determination agencies
are directed to make before regulating (unless exempted by law). l° If this
7. Rowell, supra note 1, at 737, 742.
8. Rowell, supra note 2.
9. Rowell, supra note 1, at 734, 739.
10. See id. at 725 ("If an agency is considering a rule for which the monetized costs
exceed the monetized benefits, can the consideration of non-quantifiable benefits tip the
balance?"); id. at 731 (describing "the question of whether non-monetizable benefits should
affect the result of a cost-benefit analysis" as a "dilemma"); see also infa Part IV.
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were the case, then regulators seeking to protect health, safety, or the
environment would have a strong incentive to find dollar values for any
non-monetized but partially monetizable benefits, perhaps even when this
process would delay the effective date of a regulation in a way that will cost
lives, as with NHTSA's backover regulation.
However, no executive order prohibits agencies from considering and
narratively describing non-monetized benefits in CBA, and the OMB's
guidelines on completing regulatory CBA actually encourage this
practice.'I Professor Rowell's assertion that it is an open question whether
regulators determining if a rule's benefits justify its costs can even look at
non-monetized benefits is alarming, because-if accepted-it could ratchet
down the optimal level of stringency for many regulations with valuable
benefits that are incommensurable with money.
The rationale for adopting partial monetization that Professor Rowell
provides in her related RegBlog essay is even more alarming for its
potential to ratchet down the stringency of regulations. 12 There, she
attempts to establish, via a sort of logical proof, that when choosing which
regulations to block and which to release, policymakers at the OMB's
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) should adhere to the
principle that a regulation should never cost more, in money, than "people
are willing to pay," in money. 13 Thus, even if some regulatory goods are
wholly or partially incommensurable with money, and even if it is
impossible to express all the benefits of a regulation in dollars, as a matter
of public policy OIRA should block any regulations whose monetary costs
are projected to exceed the estimated amount of money that "people are
willing to pay.' 14
The policy implications of this analysis are dramatic, as it would defend
the way regulators and OIRA actually treat non-monetizable goods in real-
world regulatory decisionmaking, 5 a practice that, until now, had enjoyed
11. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4 (2003), 10, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/aO4/a-4.pdf
[hereinafter OMB, CIRCULAR A-4]; see also infra Part IV.
12. See Rowell, supra note 2. The contentions made in Professor Rowell's RegBlog
essay have enormous policy implications for the stringency of future public health and
environmental safeguards, and are thus well worth addressing on their individual merits, as
well as in conjunction with the related arguments made in Partial Valuation.
13. Id.
14. Id. The troubling position that the OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA), acting under the authority of executive orders, can and should have the
amount of influence Professor Rowell advocates over executive agency regulators is
addressed at infra note 89 and the accompanying text.
15. See Melissa J. Luttrell, The Case for hfferential Discounting: How a Small Rate Change
Could Help Agencies Save More Lives and Make More Sense, 3 WM. & MARY POL'Y REv. 80, 108-
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almost no support in the literature. 16 This rationale for a wholly monetary
CBA-based decision criterion is particularly interesting, as it purports to
depend on neither utilitarianism nor welfarism' 7 for its validity. 18
If Professor Rowell's analysis here were correct, it would arguably
provide a compelling policy reason for regulators to attempt to monetize
benefits in the manner she proposes. However, to reach her conclusion,
Professor Rowell implicitly depends on a false assumption that there is an
identity of interests between regulatory winners and losers; without this
identity of interests, it is simply utilitarianism recast. 19 Professor Rowell also
incorrectly assumes that economic valuations based on estimated
willingness to pay, as this figure is assessed in CBA, will fully reflect larger,
societal preferences. 20 Without these assumptions, which are necessary to
support her logical argument, Professor Rowell's claim resolves to a highly
controversial normative assertion, one that requires a normative defense
she does not provide.
In short, the very thorough monetization of benefits envisioned by
Professor Rowell will often be impracticable, or, in the case of some risks
and harms, impossible. While some of the benefits agencies deem non-
monetizable could, theoretically, be monetized, commissioning the requisite
studies will often be unacceptably time consuming and expensive.2 1 This is
not to say that agencies should not strive to more completely monetize
regulatory benefits, which agencies often grossly underestimate in CBAs.
However, a directive to monetize every benefit for which there exists any
willingness to pay would too often paralyze regulators. It is preferable for
regulators to continue to have the option of providing a narrative list of
those benefits that they cannot practicably monetize, and for
decisionmakers to retain the ability to take these unmonetized benefits into
10, 110 n.93 (2011).
16. See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 4 (2006) [hereinafter, ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS]; see also
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE LJ. 165, 167
(1999). Thank you to David Driesen for raising this point in his very helpful comments.
17. For the best known and most complete welfarist justification for the current role of
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in the regulatory state, see generally ADLER & POSNER, NEW
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 16.
18. SeeRowell, supranote 1, at 741 n.70.
19. See discussion infia Part II.
20. See discussion infra Part It.
21. In at least one rulemaking, OIRA demanded the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) do a better job of monetizing regulatory benefits, even though EPA was unable to
secure funding from the OMB for original valuation studies needed to estimate the value of
these benefits. See Amy Sinden, Douglas A. Kysar, & David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analsis:
New Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 48, 54 (2009).
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account when evaluating regulations.
This response further argues that, despite methodological imperfections
in NHTSA's CBA of its rearview camera rule, a CBA that likely
underestimates benefits and overestimates costs, OIRA should not attempt
to block the regulation while it waits for a CBA that presents monetized
benefits in excess of the rule's monetized costs. NHTSA has already
established that its proposed rearview camera rule is the most cost-effective
alternative that can actually accomplish the objectives of the relevant
statute.2 2 Given this now overdue statutory mandate, 23 OIRA simply lacks
the authority to stop the rearview camera rule from moving forward.
OIRA's regulatory review authority here derives from executive orders;
neither OIRA nor any other executive actor can, by fiat, overrule the
mandates of an act of Congress.
I. REQUIRING AGENCIES TO OBTAIN AD Hoc ESTIMATES FOR
"PARTIALLY MONETIZABLE" GOODS WOULD UNACCEPTABLY SLOW
DOWN REGULATION FOR THE SAKE OF OBTAINING VALUATION
ESTIMATES OF LIMITED UTILITY
Professor Rowell is right that many goods classified as non-monetizable
in CBAs are goods for which there does exist some willingness to pay.24
She is similarly right that parents must be willing to pay some amount of
money to avoid the devastation of killing their own children in backover
accidents.25 However, the value of acquiring ad hoc valuation estimates for
all such partially monetizable goods that cannot be monetized without
significant new research would not justify the delay and expense this
extreme monetization process would require.
There are a number of benefits that agency economists deem non-
monetizable, but for which there surely exists some willingness to pay
(WTP), and with more research and study, some of these WTP figures could
be added to the benefits side of agencies' CBAs, improving the accuracy of
these analyses. However, there are some goods that agencies classify as
non-monetizable for very good reasons. In the case of a known or
22. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Low-Speed Vehicles Phase-In Reporting
Requirements, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,186, 76,189 (proposed Dec. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pts. 571, 585) ("Less expensive countermeasures ... would not satisfy Congress's
mandate for improving safety.").
23. Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
189, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 639, 640 (2008) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (Supp.
2011)) ("The Secretary shall prescribe final standards pursuant to this subsection [Rearward
Visibility] not later than 36 months after the date of enactment of this Act.").
24. See Rowell, supra note 1, at 724.
25. Id. at 742.
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suspected toxin, one reason might be that the risk of harm at the relevant
exposure level is simply unknown. Another might be that the number of
people who would be exposed to toxic levels of the substance in the absence
of regulation is unknown. The tactic of making estimates based on what is
known does not necessarily help:
[Elstimates of exposure risks produced by cancer risk assessment models can
vary by five to ten orders of magnitude, depending on the models selected
and the exposure assumptions that are plugged into those models.
Translated into economic terms, differences of this magnitude are analogous
to the difference between the price of a cup of coffee and the size of the
national debt at its peak.26
Our level of certainty of the scope and magnitude of ecological benefits
may be even lower.2 7 Because "many human and environmental risks are
not very well understood," economists "lack empirical estimates of them. '28
These gaps in understanding are not a result of lack of effort; such risks
have been the subject of extensive research in universities around the world
for decades. We cannot press pause on agencies' implementation of
statutes while we walt for defensible estimates of all regulatory benefits for
which some willingness to pay exists, but where analysts confront unknowns
that thwart monetization.
In the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) CBA for a proposed
regulation of emissions from sewage sludge incinerators, it identified the
following environmental benefits not monetized and not accounted for in
the "net benefits" figures:
* 26,000 tons of carbon monoxide
* 96 tons of HC1
* 5,500 pounds of mercury
* 1.6 tons of cadmium
* 3 tons of lead
* 90 grams of dioxins/furans
* Health effects from reduced N02 and S02 exposure 29
How might EPA have monetized the value of the three tons of annual lead
pollution the regulation will prevent? First, it would need to investigate
26. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 94 (2003) (footnote omitted).
27. Id. (stating that very "little is understood about the relationship between human
activity and environmental outcomes").
28. Id. at 103.
29. RTI INT'L, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE FOR
NEW STATIONARY SOURCES AND EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING SOURCES: SEWAGE
SLUDGE INCINERATION UNITS 1-3 (2010), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0559-0042.
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dispersal patterns of lead for each incinerator. Does particulate lead fall on
crops or farmland? To what extent does lead fall onto playgrounds,
backyards, or other areas where children-who are particularly sensitive to
lead in small amounts3 0 -may be exposed? Is the lead deposited in, for
example, public park sandboxes where children would be especially likely
to get lead on their hands-hands that may enter their mouths or may
touch the food they eat? The EPA must determine not just where the lead
will be dispersed in the absence of regulation, but how much will actually
end up in people's bodies. And, for the entire exposed population, the EPA
will want to know the amount of lead exposure from other sources, since
the health effects of lowering lead exposure vary depending on the quantity
of lead exposure from other sources. 31
When the EPA has a handle on how many people at what ages and at
which baseline levels of lead exposure will be affected by the rule, it can
start to monetize the health and other benefits of avoided lead exposures.
One problem with lead pollution is that exposure to even minute quantities
can lower the IQs of children.32 So, the EPA will need to select a strategy
for monetizing lost IQ points. In the past, it has extrapolated the value of
IQpoints from expected reductions in lifetime earnings; however, this is an
incomplete valuation, as it fails to account for potentially diminished quality
of life and for impacts on affected children's parents. 33
Once the EPA has completed this monetization exercise, it still must
identify and monetize other benefits that will result from diminished lead
exposure, such as other health benefits (besides retained IQpoints), and the
reduced crime that may occur if exposure to this powerful neurotoxin is
reduced. 34 Then, the EPA must complete the challenging exercise of
monetizing ecological harms avoided by the reduction in lead pollution.
And then the EPA would have to complete a similar exercise for all the
other unmonetized benefits on its list, a project that would likely require it
to commission expensive and time-consuming new research. While the
results of such an undertaking may have some value-even though the risk-
30. Richard L. Canfield et al., Intellectual Impairment in Children with Blood Lead
Concentrations Below 10 gper Deciliter, 348 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1517, 1518, 1525 (2003).
31. See id. at 1522-23 (noting that previous research has shown that effects of lead on
IQare proportionally greater at a lower lead concentration).
32. See id. at 1525 (stating that "there may be no threshold for the adverse consequences
of lead exposure" that are both persistent and irreversible).
33. FRANK AcKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 103-04 (2004).
34. See Steven D. Levitt, Lead and Crime, FREAKONOMICS (July 9, 2007, 10:04 AM),
http://www.freakonomics.com/2007/07/09/lead-and-crime/ (stating that evidence shows
that "high exposure to lead is harmful to both IQ and the ability to delay gratification, two
traits that could enhance the attractiveness of crime").
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analysis-and-monetization exercise will undoubtedly produce indeterminate
values for many benefits-if the agency thinks it is important to regulate
expeditiously to prevent additional harms from accruing, then it may not be
feasible for the EPA to monetize every regulatory benefit for which any
significant partially monetizable value may exist.
II. PROFESSOR ROWELL'S LOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR A MONETARY
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS DECISION CRITERION RELIES ON TWO
INVALID ASSUMPTIONS
According to Professor Rowell:
When monetized costs exceed monetized benefits, the costs of a regulation
exceed what people are willing to pay for the effects of that regulation. Such
a regulation should be barred by Executive Order 13,563, which requires
that the benefits of a regulation "justify" its costs.
The agency cannot sidestep this conclusion by reference to
nonmonetizable benefits. Nonmonetizable benefits have a monetary value of
$0-not because they are necessarily worthless in some larger sense, but
because, by definition, any value they may have cannot be expressed in
monetary terms. In other words, people are willing to pay $0 to secure a
nonmonetizable benefit-otherwise the benefit would be monetizable.3 5
Here, Professor Rowell claims to present a justification for a utilitarian
35. Rowell, supra note 2. To my knowledge, Professor Rowell has not disavowed the
contentions made in this RegBlog essay, and so-given what is at stake-these arguments
are well worth addressing. Early versions of Partial Valuation expanded and elaborated on
these arguments, which played a large role in prompting this Response, although the final
version of Partial Valuation boiled it down to only the following brief language, where
Professor Rowell continues to suggest that the CBA valuation process implies that regulators
should not regulate when monetized costs exceed monetized benefits:
As we have seen, the nonmonetary effects of regulations are monetized on the basis of
people's willingness to pay for those effects. If we take this practice seriously, it points
to a reason not to regulate when costs exceed benefits: because in those cases, the
costs of the regulation exceed what people are willing to pay for it. Regulating where
costs exceed willingness to pay may implicate autonomy concerns about respecting
people's preferences, and it may also implicate democratic concerns about the
appropriate role of agencies as agents for the public. These concerns may be
separable from the typical welfarist arguments offered in favor of cost-benefit analysis
as a decision tool. If they are, this would be a reason to refuse to regulate when costs
exceed willingness to pay, even if willingness to pay operates as a poor proxy for
welfare, as many analysts have argued it does.
Rowell, supra note 1, at 741 n.70. Given that agencies implement statutes enacted via a
democratic process, and given that economic values of fives and other intangible regulatory
goods are developed, not by popular votes, but by extrapolation from emerging, imperfect
academic studies and surveys, it is difficult to see how giving greater weight to CBAs would
make rulemaking either more respectful of people's known preferences or more democratic.
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decision criterion that works whether or not one subscribes to
utilitarianism. Instead of providing any explicitly philosophical grounding
for her proposal, she establishes its validity via a sort of logical proof. Even
assuming, arguendo, that economists are able to monetize every significant
regulatory benefit for which there exists any willingness to pay (a heroic
assumption taken up in Part I), the logical argument would still fail. This is
because the argument depends on an implicit assumption that a budgeting
principle that is self-evident in the context of individuals and individual
households applies equally to diverse societies where individuals may have
very conflicting interests and vastly different resource constraints. 'The
argument also, fatally, conflates two distinct meanings of the phrase
"willingness to pay."
A. Professor Rowell Implicitly Assumes an Identity of Interests Between Winners and
Losers
According to Professor Rowell:
At first blush, NHTSA's argument that nonquantifiable benefits can
justify monetized costs may seem plausible. But if we take seriously the claim
that these benefits cannot be monetized, the agency's argument cannot
stand.
To see this, consider how regulators monetize benefits. The benefits in a
regulatory cost-benefit analysis are calculated by reference to people's
willingness to pay money to secure those benefits. When monetized costs
exceed monetized benefits, the costs of a regulation exceed what people are
willing to pay for the effects of that regulation. Such a regulation should be
barred by Executive Order 13,563, which requires that the benefits of a
regulation "justify" its costs. 36
Professor Rowell's argument would be on sounder footing if there were a
single, unitary purchaser and beneficiary of regulatory goods. This
hypothetical purchaser and beneficiary would wisely avoid irrational
regulatory expenditures. But this reasoning only works when there is a
complete identity of interests between regulatory winners and losers.
Assuming nothing constrains an individual from spending her money
however she likes, it is perfectly logical to say it makes no sense for her to
spend more on something than she is willing to pay for it. However, the
same logic that holds for individuals does not hold at the societal level.
This becomes clearer when moving from a generic proposition like "society
should not spend more than it is willing to pay for mine safety" to a
concrete application like "federal regulators should not require Massey
36. Rowell, supra note 2; see also Rowell, supra note 1, at 741 n.70.
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Energy to spend more to prevent deadly coal mine accidents than whatever
amount coal miners, and other beneficiaries, are willing to pay for that
safety." Our "society" is composed of individuals. Under almost any
regulation, some will win and some will lose.
"Sadie should not voluntarily pay more for any good than the amount
she is willing to pay" is true as a matter of logic. However, "society should
not voluntarily pay more for regulatory benefits than the amount society is
willing to pay, where the amount society is willing to pay is defined to mean
the monetized value of the regulatory benefit to the regulatory beneficiaries,
as derived via willingness-to-pay studies" is a normative statement, and one
that requires defense. To the extent the normative justification for
Professor Rowell's neo-Benthamite decision criterion lies in utilitarianism-
or some other variety of consequentialism such as welfarism-this should
be made explicit.
For example, consider the family in Partial Valuation's "science fair"
example.37 There, parents are not willing to pay more than $25 to enter
their child into a science fair, and so it makes no sense for that family to pay
more money for the science fair than the $25 it is willing to pay.38 Does it
similarly never make sense for federal regulators to establish national public
health, safety, or environmental standards with monetized costs that exceed
the monetized value of the benefits?
A family is different, not just quantitatively, but also qualitatively, from
the aggregate population of the United States. Even if this hypothetical
family should not pay more than $25 for the science fair, it simply does not
follow that a similar logic applies to society at large. For example, assume
that the average family entering a child in that science fair is willing to pay
a maximum of $25 in admission fees, and that this $25 happens to be the
actual fee for admission. Assume that the state provides a partial subsidy of
the fair, at a cost of $5 per child, to cover the extra cost of keeping the
facility open and staffing the event, so that the total social cost of each
child's participation is $30: the $25 entry fee plus the $5 subsidy. If the
only monetizable benefits are represented by the families' willingness to pay
entry fees, would it be irrational for the state to subsidize this science fair,
given that the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits by $5 per
child?39
In truth, we do not yet have enough information to determine whether
37. See Rowell, supra note 1, at 739-41.
38. Id. at 739-40.
39. While it may appear that the state offering the subsidy had a sort of "willingness to
pay" (WTP) that should be counted, CBA only counts monetized benefits to regulatory
beneficiaries as benefits. See infra Part II.B.
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this subsidy would be a good or bad investment of government funds. We
need to know more about the students, their families' resource constraints,
the science fair itself, and how it compares to other projects that are actually
competing with the science fair for the relevant funds. Someone needs to
make a decision that considers qualitative factors, and not just the
monetized values of costs and benefits, Perhaps the students live in an
economically depressed area and their parents have a below-average ability
to pay for such educational "extras." If we imagine that families with
average incomes in that state would have been willing to pay entry fees of
$50, on average, for the exact same experience, then it may not be
unreasonable for a decisionmaker to conclude that the state's subsidy of the
facially cost-ineffective science fair is a good thing.
B. Professor Rowell Assumes that Economic Estimates of Beneficiaries' Willingness to
Pay Accurately Represent Larger Societal Preferences
The phrase "willingness to pay" can mean two things. It can be used in
a general sense to refer to the willingness of a person, entity, or society to
expend resources on some thing. And so, when legislation directing
NHTSA to improve vehicle rearview visibility to reduce backover accidents
sailed through both houses of Congress and was signed into law by
President Bush in 2008,40 this offered strong evidence of a societal
willingness to pay the costs of such a rule.
In the field of welfare economics, "willingness to pay" ("WTP," in the
jargon of CBA) is also a term of art that refers specifically to the highest
price a recipient is willing to pay for a good.41  One way regulators
monetize the value of the lives saved by regulations is through the use of
survey data; people are asked how much they would be willing to pay to
eliminate small risks of premature death and, from their responses,
economists attempt to monetize the "value of a statistical life" (VSL).42
40. Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
189, 122 Star. 639 (2008) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (Supp. 2011)).
41. See generally W. Michael Hanemann, Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept. How
Much Can Thy Differ?, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 635 (1991).
42. In addition, these "value of a statistical life" (VSL) figures are often derived from
the "compensating wage premiums" workers receive in exchange for taking on risky work;
this process has been criticized on numerous grounds as producing indefensibly low VSL
figures. See infra note 51. See generally Anna Alberini, Mhat Is a Iafe Worth? Robustness of VSL
Values from Contingent Valuation Surveys, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 783 (2005). In theory, VSLs can
also be derived via assessment of consumer expenditures made for the sake of safety. See
generally W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of
Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003). Limitations of this
approach include limitations on consumers' knowledge of risks and limitations on their
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But another way to arrive at a VSL figure is by evaluating the results of
surveys that ask, "How much would you have to be paid to voluntarily
accept being subjected to an additional risk of premature death?" A thorny
problem for CBA economists is that VSL figures derived from "willingness
to accept" (WTA) survey data are higher than VSLs derived via WTP.43
This is hardly surprising, since people have a demonstrated tendency to
want to hang on to whatever health and environmental entitlements they
"own," 44 and since WTP figures are much more tightly constrained by the
resources actually available to the research subjects. A person with no
disposable income cannot realistically buy more safety, but can nevertheless
refuse to sell off-or can set a very high price on-whatever protection he
or she already owns. 45
Professor Rowell conflates two different meanings of willingness to pay
when she argues from the premise that we, as a society, should not pay
more for regulatory goods than the amount we are "willing to pay," to the
conclusion that determinations of which proposed regulations are
sufficiently cost-justified to survive OIRA review should be made via
economic analyses wherein any benefits incommensurable with money are
monetized, to the extent possible, using WTP.46 WTP, in the CBA context,
is only one of several possible mechanisms economists may use when
monetizing extra-market goods, and, despite its name, it is not intended to
provide a complete measure of societal willingness to pay for those goods.
WTP is only meant to reflect the amount the beneficiary would pay for the
good if it were available for purchase on the market;47 it does not
completely account for human preferences from a broad, societal
perspective.
Professor Rowell is incorrect when she states in Partial Valuation that
"NHTSA determined that people's willingness to pay for protection against
disposable income.
43. Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Legal? Three Rules, 17 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 419, 420-21, 449 (1998).
44. See id. at 434; see also Hanemann, supra note 41, at 646. But see Charles R. Plott &
Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect," Subject
Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. EcON. REV. 530, 531-
32 (2005) (arguing that WTP and "willingness to accept" (WTA) may converge when
experimental subjects are better educated by testers; however, the goods at issue in this study
were tangible goods with market values, and in that sense are different from extra-market
health and environmental goods).
45. See Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 67-68 (1998).
46. Rowell, supra note 2.
47. OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 11, at 18-31; see, e.g., CAROLINE DINWIDDY &
FRANCIS TEAL, PRINCIPLES OF CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 264
(1996).
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mortality risks justifies an expenditure of $6.1 million per life saved" 48 and
that "NHTSA has told us that it believes society is willing to pay $6.1
million per life saved by the rearview camera rule." 49 When NHTSA used a
VSL of $6.1 million in its CBA of this rule, the agency did not thereby
conclude that $6.1 million represents the quantum of costs "justified" for
this benefit; as is explained in Part IV, infra, the issue of what costs are
justified is, at least in part, a normative question not conclusively answered
by the monetized values of the benefits. And, again, the VSLs used in
CBAs (such as NHTSA's $6.1 million figure) are not claimed by any agency
actor to be comprehensive measures of what sociey is willing to pay to save a
life. Such VSL estimates are based on the estimated value of a saved life to
a beneficiag, and these figures may not even be WTP values; to the extent
these values are based on premiums workers must be paid to accept riskier
work, they are probably better described as incomplete WTA measures.50
It is also noteworthy that WTP should not be the default CBA valuation
methodology for extra-market goods, such as averted deaths. As a matter
of both logic and fairness, the choice of whether to use WTP values or
WTA values for such goods should be determined by who has the stronger
rights interest in the goods in question-the intended beneficiaries or the
entity being regulated.51 As Thomas McGarity explains:
A fundamental assumption underlying most health and environmental
legislation is that each individual is entitled to some minimal level of security
from risks posed by others, and that commonly held resources are likewise
protected. Potentially affected individuals or their governmental
representatives must be persuaded to accept additional risks; they cannot be
imposed with impunity up to the point at which the potentially affected
individuals are willing to pay to prevent the risk-producing conduct. 52
Returning to the proposed rearview camera rule, Congress created an
48. Rowell, supra note 1, at 728-29.
49. Id. at 740.
50. See supra note 42; infra note 51.
51. Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., The Legal Foundation of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2 CHARLESTON L.
REv. 93, 120-21 (2007). In addition to survey data, the "compensating wage premiums"
workers must be paid to undertake additional increments of occupational risk are also used
to establish VSL values; these VSL values arguably reflect WTA values, assuming workers
are not constrained in their ability to decline the riskier work. But these VSL measures
arguably reflect decisions made by people who are less risk averse than average, uninformed
about the risks of their work, unable to freely choose safer work, or all three, and so the VSL
figures derived using this method likely understate the average monetized value of a human
life in the United States. See ACKERmAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 33, at 77-81.
52. McGarity, supra note 45, at 68 (footnote omitted); see Sidney A. Shapiro &
Christopher H. Schroeder, Bpvond Cost-Ben~fit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reoientation, 32 HARV.
ENVTL, L, REv. 433, 456 (2008).
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entitlement in the intended beneficiaries when it directed NHTSA to
promulgate regulations designed to protect pedestrians and cyclists from
backover accidents by requiring the installation of cameras, or other
equipment that would reduce backover accidents, in new passenger
vehicles. 53 From this perspective, VSLs for the rule will be too low if they
are based on WTP, as opposed to WTA.54
III. SOME NORMATIVE OBJECTIONS TO A MONETIZED COST-BENEFIT
DECISION CRITERION
Because the argument analyzed in Part II fails as a matter of logic, it is
best understood as a normative assertion-one that requires a normative
defense that Professor Rowell does not provide.
Because the proposal so closely resembles real-world regulatory review,
which rarely takes unmonetized regulatory benefits seriously,55 many
objections to the proposal apply equally to most real-world regulatory
review. CBA's defenders in the legal literature have provided thoughtful
responses to such objections, but a key concession in these responses has
been that incommensurable, non-monetizable policy goals and moral
values-such as justice, equity, and the promotion of environmental
values-should, in some cases, trump competing utilitarian concerns. 56
Since the decision criterion defended in Professor Rowell's RegBlog
essay would completely omit non-monetizable concerns when determining
whether a regulation is sufficiently cost-justified to proceed, it is missing key
concessions of the existing normative defenses of CBA, which would allow
for some consideration of important non-monetizable concerns when
evaluating whether regulations are worth their monetized costs.
53. See Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-189, 122 Star. 639 (2008) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (Supp. 2011)). For
the statistical lives that would be saved under the weakest possible regulation that the
NHTSA has the discretion to implement, it is especially difficult to justify the use of WTP-
derived VSLs.
54. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
55. See Luttrell, supra note 15, at 109-10, 110 n.93.
56. John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 395, 418-19 (2008); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 65-66 (1995); see ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 16, at 53; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit
State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 293-94 (1996) ("The various consequences of regulation ought
not to be thought commensurable along a single metric. Any cost-benefit analysis should be
accompanied by a disaggregated, qualitative description of the consequences of government
action, so that Congress and the public can obtain a fuller picture than the crude and
misleadingly precise 'bottom line' of the cost-benefit analysis." (footnote omitted)).
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A. A Monetary CBA Decision Criterion Would Fail to Account for the Rights of
Regulatory Beneficiaries
Many regulatory beneficiaries have a right, often a statutory right, to
regulatory benefits that could appear to be bad investments under CBA.
When we throw these rights and entitlements out the window--except to
the extent there exists a willingness to pay for them, i.e., except for this
partial, entirely instrumental value-and when we make decisions based
solely on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, 57 we have adopted a policy of strict
utilitarianism. This policy is then vulnerable to all the objections that
plague utilitarianism. For example, philosophies of ethics and justice that
stand in opposition to utilitarianism can be found in the writings of Rawls
and Kant, among numerous other philosophers. 58  Simply put,
utilitarianism is controversial:
Like any comprehensive moral or religious doctrine, utilitarianism will
inevitably be controversial. Many persons will reasonably reject it....
Basing state policy on utilitarianism or entrenching utilitarianism into the
constitution of a democratic society as the foundational value would be akin
to establishment of religion. No more than Buddhism, Roman Catholicism,
or any other comprehensive doctrine should utilitarianism be advanced for
the role of [public philosophy] .59
This is not to say that utilitarian, consequentialist concerns have no place
at all in setting regulatory policy. But an adoption of a strict monetary
CBA decision criterion would amount to a complete rejection of all other
rights and values-except to the extent they have an instrumental value
that can be monetized-for most rulemakings. Such an "efficiency iber
alles" policy would stand in tension with the policy goals of many, if not
most, of the statutes that regulators are charged with implementing through
their regulations, as numerous commentators have persuasively argued.60
57. Under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, a policy is socially beneficial if it has the effect of
making one set of people better off and another set worse off, so long as what the winners
gain has a higher value than what the losers lose. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and
Political Basis of the Efficienqy Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491
(1980).
58. CARL L. BANKSTON III, Nozick, Robert, in 2 ETHICS 1053, 1054 (John K. Roth ed.,
rev. ed. 2005); see, e.g., RICHARD A. SPINELLO, Deontological Ethics, in 1 ETHICS 367, 368 (John
K. Roth ed., rev. ed. 2005).
59. RichardJ. Arneson, Rawls Versus Utilitarianism in the Light of Political Liberalism, in THE
IDEA OF A POLITICAL LIBERALISM: ESSAYS ON RAWLS 231, 246-47 (Victoria Davion & Clark
Wolf eds., 2000).
60. Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 52, at 473 ("[T]o the extent that CBA is defended
on normative grounds, it determines the value of proposed policy and regulatory options
using just one factor-economic efficiency. This makes CBA unhelpful in implementing the
other policy values that underlie most regulatory statutes. Moreover, because it is focused
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B. Many Societal "Goods" Have More Than an Instrumental Value
A recent outraged blog post from Lisa Heinzerling highlights the clear,
inherent tension between a completely monetary CBA decision criterion
and the protection of rights in a civil society. 61 When the Department of
Justice (DOJ) issued regulations-mandated by statute-intended to
control rampant rape and other sexual abuse of prisoners, DOJ was
required to submit a CBA of the proposal to OIRA. And so, in a chilling
report, DOJ dutifully attempted to provide the monetized value of rape and
sexual abuse. 62  A forcible rape of an adult prisoner was assigned a
monetary value of -$310,000 or -$480,000, while "contacts with a staff
member that only involved touching of the inmate's buttocks, thigh, penis,
breasts, or vagina in a sexual way" were assigned a value of -$600 per
incident. 63 Although this CBA apparently did not influence DOJ's final
rules, 64 in theory, we could use monetization to determine whether
prevention of sexual assault is worth the expense; this appears to be how we
would make such decisions under a strictly monetary CBA decision
criterion.65
on only one value, CBA does not generate any discussion of how to resolve conflicts between
efficiency and other regulatory and policy goals to the extent that this conflict is relevant
under a regulatory statute."); see David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental,
Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatoy Reform, 32
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1, 92-93 (2005); see also Sinden, Kysar, & Driesen, supra note 21,
at 56-57 (summarizing philosophical objections to CBA in the regulatory context). See
generally Amy Sinden, In Defense ofAbsolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law,
90 IOWAL. REV. 1405, 1408-10 (2005).
61. Lisa Heinzerling, Cost-Benefit Jumps the Shark" The Department of Justice's Economic
Analysis of Prison Rape, GEO. L. FAC. BLOG (June 13, 2012), http://gulcfac.typepad.com/
georgetown-university~jaw/2012/06/cost-benefit-jumps-the-shark.html.
62. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: NOTICE OF FINAL RULE
FOR PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT (PREA) STANDARDS (May 17, 2012), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/programs/pdfs/prea-ria.pdf.
63. Id. at 24, 64.
64. Heinzerling, supra note 61.
65. In a blog post responding to Professor Heinzerling, Rick Hills argues that the
Department ofJustice's (DOJ's) regulations might have prevented more assaults if DOJ had
given more weight to the results of its CBA. Rick Hills, In Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis:
Lessons from Recent Rules for Preventing Prison Rape, PRAwFSBLAWG (June 16, 2012, 11:51 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012 /06/in-defense-of-cost-benefit-analysis-
lessons-from-recent-rules-for-preventing-prison-rape.html. Even if this is true, it is a
consequentialist argument; CBA will point toward less protection of human rights in other
cases. Professor Heinzerling argues that CBA is not the appropriate decision criterion for
determinations of how much sexual assault of prisoners to prohibit, but she does not claim
CBA will always result in less protection for prisoners.
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IV. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 13,563 ARE
UNAMBIGUOUS IN THAT NEITHER REQUIRES REGULATIONS TO PASS A
"MONETARY CBA"
Professor Rowell writes that President Obama's Executive Order on
regulatory review, Executive Order 13,563,66 is ambiguous in that it is not
clear whether agencies can rely on non-monetized benefits in determining
that benefits justify costs for a rule whose monetized benefits exceed its
monetized costs. 67
But there is no ambiguity there. The language in Executive Order
13,563 to the effect that benefits must justify costs is taken directly from
Executive Order 12,866,68 a Clinton-era order on regulatory review that
Executive Order 13,563 explicitly reaffirms and does not amend.69
Executive Order 12,866 provides that, to the extent permitted by law,
"[e]ach agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended
regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to
quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs." 70
Nothing at all in either Executive Order requires monetization of any costs or
benefits, and certainly neither requires that monetized costs must exceed
monetized benefits.
In 1981, Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291,71 which was
replaced in 1993 by Executive Order 12,866. Executive Order 12,291
provided that "[r]egulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the
potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to
society." 72
Justify" means "to prove or show to be just, right, or reasonable. ' 73
"Outweigh" means "to exceed in weight, value, or importance. '74 By
changing this word, and by explicitly recognizing concerns like equity and
distributional fairness, 75 Clinton softened the CBA requirements that had
earlier existed under Executive Order 12,291.
The OMB's 2003 guidelines to agencies conducting CBA under
66. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012).
67. Rowell, supra note 1, at 725, 730-31.
68. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1994)).
69. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. at 215.
70. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. at 639.
71. Exec. OrderNo. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
72. Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
73. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 680 (11 th ed, 2003).
74. Id. at 882.
75. Exec, Order No. 12,866, 3 CFR, at 639.
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Executive Order 12,866, which were issued under George W. Bush's
Administration and which remain active, support this construction. The
guidelines provide: "When important benefits and costs cannot be
expressed in monetary units, [CBA] is less useful, and it can even be
misleading, because the calculation of net benefits in such cases does not
provide a full evaluation of all relevant benefits and costs." 76 Moreover, the
guidelines explicitly recognize that nonmonetized benefits can influence
policy outcomes: "For cases in which the unquantified benefits or costs
affect a policy choice, you should provide a clear explanation of the
rationale behind the choice."77
In sum, nothing in the plain language of the executive orders requires
that all regulations subject to regulatory review be evaluated under a
formal, completely quantitative, and fully monetized analysis. There is
nothing in the text of the currently operative executive orders on regulatory
review that would prohibit an analysis that monetizes some goods, describes
others qualitatively, and then assesses whether the regulatory benefits of a
rule are reasonable, given its costs. Professor Rowell's conclusion that there
is no place for consideration of non-monetized goods in a "monetary cost-
benefit analysis"78 is irrelevant to actual regulatory policy because there is
simply no requirement that the CBA completed by agencies during the
regulatory review process be fully monetary.
V. DESPITE METHODOLOGICAL IMPERFECTIONS IN NHTSA's CBA,
OIRA SHOULD NOT BLOCK THE PENDING BACKOVER RULE
For the reasons explained above, to the extent the monetized values of
the deaths and injuries to be prevented by the NHTSA regulation were
calculated using WTP estimates-as opposed to WTA estimates--they are
likely to be too low. And there are a host of other reasons the prospective
monetized benefits of the rule were arguably understated by NHTSA;
Professor Rowell identifies many of these. For example, in theory,
regulators could find creative ways to partially monetize difficult-to-value
goods like avoiding the horrific experience of having run over one's own
child, especially if the agency's failure to monetize this good may be what
causes OIRA to kick the regulation back to the agency. 79
In this way, Partial Valuation builds on Professor Rowell's earlier work
describing the systematic understatement of regulatory benefits in agency
CBAs. For example, she has argued convincingly that agencies relying on
76. OMB, CIRcULAR A-4, supra note 11, at 10.
77. Id. at 27.
78. Rowell, supra note 1, at 741.
79. Seo id. at 737,
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existing WTP survey data to calculate the value of averted deaths are likely
engaging in a form of "double discounting," thereby improperly reducing
the monetized value of lives to be saved by regulation. 80 Professor Rowell
has also advocated use of VSL multipliers for lives to be saved in the
futures8'-another step that would increase projected regulatory benefits.
Although, if regulators must evaluate health and environmental standards
using CBA, I would go further than the VSL multiplier approach, and
would reduce discount rates for all regulatory health and environmental
benefits. 82 Another problem with NHTSA's CBA of its backover rule is
that the 7% discount rate is indefensibly high.83  Also, if history is any
guide, the rule's costs have most likely been overstated. 84
By proposing ways CBAs could be modified to provide more complete
accountings of costs and benefits, Professor Rowell follows in the steps of
Jeremy Bentham, who was not as cold-hearted in his utilitarianism as many
commentators assume. 85 For example, while modern-day agency CBA
would favor an act that reduces the value of a poor person's home by
$1,000, if that act would create at least $1,001 in immediate new wealth for
a very rich person, Bentham believed that utilitarian decisionmaking should
reflect the greater utility that goods, like money, have for people who lack
them ("diminishing marginal utility," in the language of economics).86
Professor Rowell is right that many CBA methodologies are in need of
reform, and she is right that the benefits side of the ledger is systematically
diminished when certain goods that could have been at least partially
monetized are omitted from the net benefits analysis altogether. However,
80. Arden Rowell, The Cost of ime: Haphazard Discounting and the Undervaluation of
Regulatoy Benefits, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1505, 1525-34 (2010).
81. Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatoy Benefits: Risk, Money, and
Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 171, 183-84 (2007).
82. See Luttrell, supra note 15, at 122 (arguing for the discount rate for health and
environmental goods to be lower than the rate for compliance costs).
83. Graham, supra note 56, at 504 ("[W]e now realize [a 7% discount rate is] too
high."); see also Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 81, at 206 n. 126 (7% rate "seems badly
outmoded").
84. See generally David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REv.
335 (2006); Thomas 0. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1997 (2002).
85. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, How Economists Bastardized Benthamite Utilitarianism,
(unpublished manuscript) http://www.princeton.edu/-reinhard/pdfs/100-NEXTHOW_
ECONOMISTSBASTARDIZEDBENTHAMITEUTILITARIANISM.pdf (last visited
Nov. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Reinhardt, Utilitarianism], cited with approval in Uwe E. Reinhardt,
When Value Judgments Masquerade as Science, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX (Aug. 27, 2010 6:00 AM),
http://economix.blogs.nyfimes.com/2010/08/27 /when-value-judgments-masquerade-as-
science/.
86. Reinhardt, Utilitarianism, supra note 85.
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many of the much-needed CBA methodological reforms, including
Professor Rowell's recommendations regarding the problem of "double
discounting, '87 are unlikely to be operationalized by agency analysts until
after time-consuming new studies have been commissioned and completed.
In the meantime, OIRA should not block NHTSA's backover rule. 88 The
executive orders that empower OIRA regulatory review are only effective
"to the extent permitted by law." 89 When a statute directs an agency to act,
the administration cannot overrule the statute by fiat. NHTSA's final rule
is mandated by statute, and is now overdue. 90 While-to meet the Act's
requirement that NHTSA enable drivers to detect children behind the
vehicle-NHTSA was permitted to consider technology, including sensors,
cameras, and mirror systems,91 in field tests, only the video cameras were
effective. 92 NHTSA found that "[l]ess expensive countermeasures, i.e.,
mirrors and sensors, have thus far shown very limited effectiveness and thus
would not satisfy Congress's mandate for improving safety." 93
While stalling the rule may have saved automakers some compliance
costs in the short run, it is highly unlikely that automakers would actually
prefer a switch from safety equipment consumers like, such as back-up
cameras, which are already standard equipment in 45% of 2012 model
cars,94 to something less effective that will likely be unpopular with
consumers, such as unsightly "cross-view" side mirrors that extend much
87. See generally Rowell, supra note 80.
88. See Rowell, supra note 2 ("OIRA should refuse to let the regulation through until the
agency completes an adequate analysis.").
89. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 217 (2012) ("Nothing in this order shall be
construed to impair or otherwise affect... authority granted by law to a department or
agency, or the head thereof .... ); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994)
(reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) ("Nothing in this order shall be construed as
displacing the agencies' authority or responsibilities, as authorized by law.").
90. See Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-189, §2(b), 122 Stat. 639, 639-42 (2008) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30111
(Supp. 2011)).
91. Id.
92. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Low-Speed Vehicles Phase-In Reporting
Requirements, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,186, 76,189 (proposed Dec. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pts. 571, 585); see also NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., VEHICLE
BACKOVER AvoIDANCE TECHNOLOGY STUDY 3-5 (Nov. 2006) (while sensors and mirrors
were also statutory options, they were highly unsuccessful at preventing backover accidents
in NHTSA field tests) [hereinafter VBATS].
93. 75 Fed. Reg. at 76,189.
94. Nick Bunkley, US. Rule Set for Cameras at Cars' Rear, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2012, at
A3. Smaller, convex "look-down" mirrors-which can only be mounted on a subset of
passenger vehicles-were also studied by NHTSA, and-like cross-view mirrors-were
effective at preventing backover accidents in 0% of trials. VBATS, supra note 92, at 3.
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further out to the sides of vehicles, as on a school bus.95
Mandatory back-up camera systems may cost some consumers an extra
$58 to $203 per vehicle, 96 a significant extra cost. But there are currently
no regulations governing rearview visibility97 and, in vehicles without back-
up cameras, the rearview blind spot-the area that cannot be seen even
when one uses side and rearview mirrors and also looks over one's
shoulder-can extend up to 101 feet behind the vehicle.98 To demonstrate
the need for rearview cameras, one advocacy group managed to fit sixty-
two children in the blind spot behind a single large SUV; the driver, despite
using all mirrors and looking over her shoulder, could see none of these
children. 99
When CBA proponents argue against intuitively appealing, but allegedly
"cost-ineffective," regulations, they often note that every dollar spent as a
result of such regulations is a dollar that cannot be spent on goods like
"housing, education, transportation, [and] national security."' 100 While this
is true, because there is no mechanism that will cause the averted
regulatory costs to be diverted into such projects, it is equally true that this
is money that cannot be spent on chrome rims, plasma televisions, spa
treatments, or top-shelf vodka. Forgone national security, for example, is
only an opportunity cost of the NHTSA regulation to the extent the
NHTSA regulation actually diverts resources away from national security.
Even if, by preventing NHTSA from issuing this regulation, OIRA could
somehow cause the averted regulatory costs to be used in a more cost-
beneficial way (from a broad, societal perspective), OIRA is simply not
empowered to override any allegedly poor social welfare choices embodied
in acts of Congress. NHTSA was supposed to finalize its backover rule last
year, but missed its deadline. According to NHTSA's estimates, for every
year of regulatory delay, there will be approximately 7,000-8,000
additional injuries due to backover accidents, and about 100 extra
deaths.101
And that is a shame.
95. See Brian Naylor, Government Backs Up On Rearview Car Cameras, NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(Mar. 02, 2012), http://m.npr.org/news/Politics/ 147742760?singlePage=true.
96. 75 Fed. Reg. at 76,236.
97. Bunkley, supra note 94, atAl, A3.
98. Id. at A3; see also The Danger of Blind Zones. the Area Behind Your Vehicle Can Be a Killing
Zone, CONSUMER REP., http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2012/03/the-danger-of-
blind-zones/index.htm (last updated March 2012) (reporting that rear blind spots were as far
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